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This study investigates whether short sellers anticipate undervaluation infor-
mation before a repurchase announcement. Apart from exploring investment
opportunities via searching for unfavourable information, short sellers should
have the same incentive to identify favourable information to prevent potential
losses. An observed significant negative relation between pre-announcement
short selling activities and announcement abnormal returns supports the
informed hypothesis. This negative relation is stronger under high levels of
information asymmetry, and more significant when the repurchase announce-
ment is associated with the undervaluation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Managers make share repurchase announcements to sig-
nal undervaluation to the market, which subsequently
leads to a price increase because of the value correction.
However, firms also use repurchase programmes to dis-
tribute cash when they run out of good investment
opportunities (Grullon & Michaely, 2004) or as part of a
strategy to rebalance its capital structure (Dittmar, 2000).
The value of a repurchase announcement signal differs
according to the actual plan behind the scenes.
The objective of this study is to determine whether
short sellers acquire private information prior to rep-
urchase announcements to anticipate the value of the
announcement. Short selling is a strategy in which
traders sell stocks that they do not own when they
believe that the stock will fall in price in the future when
they are committed to buying the share. Short sellers
have strong incentives to acquire information before
unfavourable news to profit from a high selling price
(Christophe, Ferri, & Angel, 2004; Christophe, Ferri, &
Hsieh, 2010; Desai, Krishnamurthy, & Venkataraman,
2006; Henry, Kisgen, & Wu, 2015), while they should
have the same incentive to anticipate favourable news to
prevent potential losses due to a high buy-back price in
the future. If firms announce a share repurchase to signal
the stock's undervaluation, then potential price jumps
following the signal would become the motive for short
sellers to keep silence in their short selling activities to
avoid losses.
The following empirical analysis investigates three
hypotheses on short sellers' anticipation for share rep-
urchase announcements. Hypothesis 1 states that if short
sellers are informed traders, then the returns associated
with repurchase announcements should be negatively
associated with the level of short selling before the
announcements. The higher the price jump following the
repurchase announcement is, the greater the buying costs
are for short sellers who short sell the stock in advance
and buy it back in the future. Therefore, the value of the
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repurchase announcement, measured by announcement
abnormal returns, generates strong incentives to acquire
private information to prevent potential losses. I conduct
both a portfolio comparison and multivariate regression
analysis and find an association between high announce-
ment abnormal returns and with low pre-announcement
short interest ratio (SIR), which suggests that short sellers
are informed about the value of the announcement in
advance.
The incentive to acquire information should be
greater if the potential degree of mispricing is high. Firms
with high levels of information asymmetry are more
likely to be mispriced. Therefore, in my second hypothe-
sis, I predict that the negative relation between SIR and
abnormal announcement returns should be more signifi-
cant under high levels of pre-announcement information
asymmetry. I find a stronger negative relation for firms
with high stock price volatility, low analyst coverage, or
small size, which supports hypothesis 2.
Third, short sellers, who benefits from the deprecia-
tion of the share price, should have a strong incentive to
detect undervalued stocks and try to avoid shorting
those stocks. Therefore, if the repurchase announce-
ment is associated with the value correction rationale,
then the incentive to acquire ex ante private information
should be greater. Consistent with this expectation, I
observe a stronger negative relation between SIR and
abnormal announcement returns when the repurchase
announcement is more likely to be associated with
undervaluation, proxied by high book-to-market
(BM) ratios. I do not observe any significant increase in
the negative relation when the repurchase announce-
ment is more likely to be for other reasons, such as to
distribute excess cash (proxied by high free cash flows),
or to adjust the firm's leverage (proxied by low leverage
ratios).
This paper contributes to the repurchase literatures
that focus on the managerial value correction and signal-
ling hypothesis. Managers use repurchases primarily to
signal better prospects when the share is undervalued
(Huang & Thakor, 2013; Stephens & Weisbach, 1998;
Vermaelen, 1981). However, others argue that manager
could initiate a repurchase programme to meet other
objectives. For example, Grullon and Ikenberry (2000),
Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Brav, Graham, Harvey,
and Michaely (2005) show that firms recently favour
repurchases as a method to pay shareholders as it is more
flexible and tax efficient than dividends are.
Dittmar (2000) and Hovakimian, Opler, and Tit-
man (2001) find that firms also buy-back shares to
increase their leverage ratios. My study shows that
sophisticated market participants, such as short sellers,
have incentives to determine the motive behind a
repurchase announcement to prevent losses following
the signalling effects.
Apart from the repurchase literature, my study also
contributes to the literature on short selling. Existing
studies show evidence that short sellers hold superior
information, but mainly concentrate on unfavourable
events, such as downside earnings surprises (Christophe
et al., 2004), earnings restatements (Desai et al., 2006),
financial misconduct (Karpoff & Lou, 2010), analyst
downgrades (Christophe et al., 2010), stock crashes
(Callen & Fang, 2015), and bond rating downgrades
(Henry et al., 2015). My study adds to this literature by
showing that short sellers can even anticipate favourable
news as they have an incentive to prevent potential
losses.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: I
develop the hypotheses in Section 2 and describe the data
and methodologies in Section 3. I report the empirical
results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 | BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES
Short selling is generally motived by high profits follow-
ing price depreciations. In short selling, traders borrow
stocks and sell them at a high price and buy them back at
a low price. Theoretical models (Diamond &
Verrecchia, 1987) suggest that short sellers normally have
access to private information as shorting involves higher
transaction costs than does purchasing shares or selling
shares the trader already own. Empirical studies show
that, short sellers often show their ability to identify low
future returns (Asquith, Pathak, & Ritter, 2005; Boehmer,
Jones, & Zhang, 2008; Desai, Ramesh, Ramu
Thiagarajan, & Balachandran, 2002) or downward stock
price movements following unfavourable news
(Christophe et al., 2004; Christophe et al., 2010; Desai
et al., 2006; Henry et al., 2015; Karpoff & Lou, 2010).
However, there is little discussion of short selling
activities corresponding to favourable news.1
The potential for unlimited losses from price appre-
ciations would increase short sellers' incentive to
acquire private information to anticipate favourable
news. An undervaluation signal from the firm itself, like
a repurchase announcement, is clearly an event that
short sellers should avoid. Anticipating the value of a
repurchase announcement, which firms often use to sig-
nal undervaluation (Babenko, Tserlukevich, &
Vedrashko, 2012; Huang & Thakor, 2013; Stephens &
Weisbach, 1998), saves short sellers from potential
losses. The higher the price jump following the under-
valuation signal, the greater the losses short sellers will
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suffer if they are in a short position before the
announcement. Therefore, if short sellers are informed
of this favourable information, then short selling activi-
ties should stay at a low level when the potential price
jump following the repurchase announcement will
be high.
Hypothesis 1 The returns associated with repurchase
announcements should be negatively associated with
the level of short selling before the announcements.
If hypothesis 1 is true, then short sellers do pay atten-
tion to favourable information to avoid potential losses
caused by a correction of mispricing. The greater the
information asymmetry is, the more likely it is that the
stock is mispriced. Therefore, I expect short sellers to
have a stronger incentive to acquire private information
under high levels of information asymmetry.
Hypothesis 2 The negative relation between pre-
announcement short selling activities and abnormal
announcement returns is stronger under high levels
of pre-announcement information asymmetry.
Not all repurchase announcement aims to signal
undervaluation. Firms can initiate repurchases to distrib-
ute excess capital or optimize the capital structure
(Dittmar, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 2004). The incentive
to acquire private information should be stronger if the
announcement is more likely to be motivated by the
objective of correcting undervaluation.
Hypothesis 3 The negative relation between pre-
announcement short selling activities and abnormal
announcement returns is more significant if the firm
makes a repurchase announcement for undervalua-
tion reasons.
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
I collected the sample of open-market share repurchase
announcements between 1980 and 2016 from the Thom-
son Financial Securities Data Company's (SDC) database.
I keep only the first announcement if there are multiple
repurchase announcements released within the same
month. I compiled the short selling data from the COM-
PUSTAT Supplemental Short Interest File. Consistent
with prior studies (Callen & Fang, 2015; Desai
et al., 2006; Kot, 2007), I measure the SIR as the number
of shares shorted on the 15th business day of each
month2 scaled by number of shares outstanding. I
obtained the firm-level accounting data from the
COMPUSTAT annual files and analyst forecasts data
from I/B/E/S. The final sample consists of 17,437
observations.
I measure the value of the repurchase announce-
ment using 3-day abnormal announcement returns,
buy-and-hold abnormal returns BHAR(−1, +1). I also
include the long-term market reactions, measured by
BHAR(+2, +252), to consider potential post-
announcement drifts 1 year after the announcement
(Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1995). Piling up
daily returns over a long-term period may potentially
cause measurement biases (Kothari & Warner, 1997).
Hence, apart from using daily returns, I also use
monthly returns to calculate the ex post 1-year BHARs.
Following Barber and Lyon (1997), I employ the control
firm approach to correct the misspecification of the tests
for detecting long-term abnormal returns. I calculate the
BHARs following the market-adjusted model in which I
use Fama–French 5 × 5 size and BM portfolios as bench-
mark portfolios.3 I match the sample firms to an appro-
priate size portfolio for the preceding first of July based
on their market value of equity (closing price per share
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding)
1 month before the announcement. I then match the
sample firms to an appropriate BM portfolio for the pre-
ceding first of July based on their BM ratios, which I cal-
culate as book value of equity (COMPUSTAT Data Item
60) in year t-1 corresponding to the announcement
divided by the market value of equity 1 month before
the announcement. I exclude firms with a negative book
value of equity.
As an alternative method to calculate abnormal
announcement returns, I use cumulative abnormal
returns CAR(−1, +1), which I calculate following the
market model in which the estimated parameters are
based on the CRSP value-weighted index with an estima-
tion window of (−252, −44). I sourced the daily return
data from the CRSP daily stock file.
To test the relation between SIR and the value of the
repurchase announcement, I first conduct a portfolio
comparison. I sort all sample firms into low, median,
high groups based on the pre-announcement short selling
activities (the SIR 1 month before the repurchase
announcement, and the average SIR over the last
3 months before the repurchase announcement, respec-
tively). I then compare the announcement abnormal
returns between the low and high SIR (or avg_SIR)
groups to investigate whether short sellers can anticipate
the value of the repurchase announcements.
To control firm-level characteristics, I further test the
relation between pre-announcement short selling activi-
ties and the value of the announcement by estimating the
following multi-variable regression:
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BHARi = α0 + α1SIRi + α2Controlsi + εi ð1Þ
where BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns during
the three-day (−1, +1) event window. SIR is the short
interest ratio 1 month before the announcement. Controls
contains a set of common control variables from previous
studies (Babenko et al., 2012; Gong, Louis, & Sun, 2008)
showing that they have explanatory power for the market
performance associated with repurchase announcements.
The set of control variables includes stock price runup,
repurchase size, cash, firm size, analyst coverage, price
volatility, free cash flow, leverage, and Tobin's Q. I mea-
sure stock price runup by pre-announcement abnormal
returns, BHAR(−43, −4). Repurchase size is to the pro-
posed value of the transaction normalized by the market
value of equity. Cash is the latest cash and equivalents
(COMPUSTAT Data Item 1) scaled by total assets
(COMPUSTAT Data Item 6) prior to the announcement.
Firm size is the market value of equity 1 month prior to
the announcement. Analyst coverage is the number of
analyst forecasts 1 month prior to the announcement
scaled by 1,000. Price volatility is the standard deviation
of the stock's returns over the year prior to the announce-
ment. Free cash flow is the latest operating income before
depreciation (COMPUSTAT Data Item 13) scaled by total
assets prior to the announcement. Leverage is the latest
ratio of debt to market value of equity prior to the
announcement, where debt equals the debt in current lia-
bilities (COMPUSTAT Data Item 34) plus long-term debt
(COMPUSTAT Data Item 142). Tobin's Q is proxied by the
latest BM ratio prior to the announcement. Table 1 pro-
vides a statistical summary of the explanatory variables.
I control for industry using industry dummies based
on the Fama and French 12 industry classification. I sort
stocks into 12 industry categories based on the four-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes provided
by CRSP. I also include year dummies to control for time
variations.
I further replace the dependent variable BHAR(−1,
+1) with CAR(−1, +1) to provide an alternative
TABLE 1 Statistic summary of
main variables
N Mean Median 5th 95th SD
SIR 17,437 2.17% 0.35% 0.00% 10.15% 0.0425
avg_SIR 17,437 2.14% 0.38% 0.00% 9.96% 0.0412
BHAR(−1, +1) 17,437 2.11% 1.42% −7.49% 13.84% 0.0791
CAR(−1, +1) 17,437 2.10% 1.44% −7.71% 13.79% 0.0799
BHAR(+2, +252) 17,437 4.02% −1.07% −57.09% 75.65% 0.5535
CAR(−43, −4) 17,437 −5.08% −3.41% −35.97% 19.46% 0.1845
BHAR(−43, −4) 17,437 −4.26% −3.36% −29.95% 17.45% 0.1583
Repurchase size 17,437 0.0804 0.0597 0.0173 0.2461 0.0587
Cash 17,437 0.1495 0.0819 0.0061 0.5509 0.1590
Firm size 17,437 6.1651 6.0483 2.9181 9.9055 2.0070
Analyst coverage 17,437 7 4 0 24 7.9650
Price volatility 17,437 0.1006 0.0879 0.0381 0.2238 0.0504
Free cash flow 17,437 0.1228 0.1197 0.0081 0.2961 0.0856
Leverage 17,437 0.4642 0.1997 0.0000 2.3196 0.6307
Tobin's Q 17,437 0.6510 0.5675 0.1391 1.5766 0.3932
Note: This table reports the statistic summary of main variables. SIR is the number of share
shorted normalized by number of shares outstanding 1 month prior to the repurchase
announcements. Avg_SIR is the average SIR 3 months prior to the repurchase announcements.
BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and French 5*5 size and
BM benchmark portfolios. CARs are calculated following the market model with CRSP value-
weighted index. Repurchase size the proposed value of transaction normalized by the market
value of equity. Cash is the latest cash and equivalents scaled by the total assets. Firm size is the
market value of equity. Analyst coverage is the number of analyst forecasts. Price volatility is
the standard deviation of stocks returns over the previous year of the announcements. Free cash
flow is the operating income before depreciation scaled by the total assets. Leverage is the ratio
of debt to market value of equity, where debt equals to debt in current liabilities plus long-term
debt. Tobin's Q is proxied by the book-to-market ratio.
4 ZHENG
estimation of abnormal returns, and using BHAR(+2,
+252) and ex post 1-year BHARs to capture the long-term
residuals following the immediate reaction. I further run
regressions on avg_SIR, which is the average SIR over
the last 3 months corresponding to the announcement,
instead of regressing on SIR with a one-month lag as a
robustness check.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, I first explore whether short sellers antici-
pate the value of repurchase announcements by investigat-
ing the relation between SIR and announcement returns. I
then investigate whether this relation is affected by the level
of information asymmetry because the incentive to acquire
private information is stronger for firms with a high poten-
tial of mispricing. Finally, I discuss whether short sellers
can detect the possible reasons behind the repurchase
announcement, which will subsequently affect the relation-
ship between the SIR and announcement returns.
4.1 | Relation between short selling and
the value of repurchase announcements
I argued in the Introduction that short sellers have an
incentive to acquire information to prevent losses. An
implication of this argument is that the SIR is negatively
correlated with announcement abnormal returns. To test
this prediction, I first sort all sample firms into low,
median, and high groups based on the SIR or average
SIR, respectively. I then calculate the buy-and-hold
abnormal returns over day −1 and + 1 corresponding to
the repurchase announcement, and compare the
announcement return across SIR groups. My main results
are based on BHAR(−1, +1), while I report further
results based on CAR(−1, +1) as an alternative approach,
as well as BHAR(+2, +252) and ex post 1-year BHARs to
incorporate long-term announcement drifts.
Table 2 shows the results of portfolio comparison
across low to high SIR groups. In general, the average
announcements returns are significantly positive among
all SIR groups, which suggests that repurchase announce-
ments send out favourable news in average. Specifically,
there is a significant increase in announcement returns
as we move from the high to low SIR groups. The com-
parison of the announcement returns for high and low
SIR groups is significant and consistent across all mea-
surements of announcement value. By extending the pre-
announcement observation period of short selling inter-
est up to three months before the repurchase announce-
ment, the results are unchanged.
The regression results reported in Table 3 present a
similar picture with the controls for firm characteris-
tics. The estimated coefficient in the regression of
TABLE 2 Portfolio comparison across SIR groups
Panel A: Abnormal returns across SIR groups
BHAR(−1, +1) CAR(−1, +1) BHAR(+2, +252) Ex post 1-year BHAR (monthly)
P1 (low) 3.19%*** 3.20%*** 6.53%*** 6.03%***
P2 1.64%*** 1.63%*** 2.25%*** 1.60%***
P3 (high) 1.38%*** 1.35%*** 2.98%*** 2.33%***
P3-P1 −1.81%*** −1.86%*** −3.55%*** −3.70%***
Panel B: Abnormal returns across avg_SIR groups
BHAR(−1, +1) CAR(−1, +1) BHAR(+2, +252) Ex post 1-year BHAR (monthly)
P1 (low) 3.19%*** 3.22%*** 6.74%*** 6.21%***
P2 1.64%*** 1.63%*** 2.15%*** 1.60%***
P3 (high) 1.43%*** 1.39%*** 2.99%*** 2.29%***
P3-P1 −1.77%*** −1.82%*** −3.76%*** −3.92%***
Note: This table reports the portfolio comparison of the value of announcement returns across SIR group. All sample firms are sorted into
low, median, high groups based on the pre-announcement short interest ratio, SIR and avg_SIR, respectively. SIR is the number of share
shorted normalized by number of shares outstanding 1 month prior to the repurchase announcements. Avg_SIR is the average SIR 3 months
prior to the repurchase announcements. BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and French 5*5 size and BM
benchmark portfolios. CARs are calculated following the market model with CRSP value-weighted index. Daily returns are used for calculat-
ing CARs and BHARs among the first three columns. Monthly returns are used for calculating ex post 1-year BHAR following the repurchase
announcement in the last column. Conventional t-statistics are applied with significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, which are represented by
*, **, and ***, respectively.
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BHAR(−1, +1) on SIR is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. This negative relation is not sensitive to the
choice of estimation approach by replacing dependent
variable, BHAR(−1, +1), with CAR(−1, +1). Apart
from short sellers' anticipation of short-term
announcement value, I further find that the negative
relation between pre-announcement short selling inter-
est and the long-term value of repurchase announce-
ments holds up to 1 year after the announcements.
Again, the results are not sensitive to the number of
pre-announcement observation months of short
interest.
TABLE 3 Regression results on SIR
BHAR(−1, +1) CAR(−1, +1) BHAR(+2, +252) Ex post 1-year BHAR (monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIR −0.076*** −0.072*** −0.215** −0.234**
(−4.151) (−3.847) (−2.089) (−2.246)
Avg_SIR −0.074*** −0.071*** −0.175* −0.187*
(−3.979) (−3.789) (−1.649) (−1.715)
Stock price runup −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.020*** −0.020*** 0.059 0.059 0.096** 0.097**
(−8.637) (−8.641) (−3.242) (−3.249) (1.228) (1.236) (2.008) (2.020)
Repurchase size 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.283*** 0.281*** 0.292*** 0.290***
(8.448) (8.441) (8.396) (8.393) (2.894) (2.879) (3.058) (3.039)
Cash −0.003 −0.003 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.037 0.037
(−0.571) (−0.577) (0.082) (0.078) (0.669) (0.656) (0.887) (0.872)
Firm size −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−8.472) (−8.482) (−9.271) (−9.270) (−0.084) (−0.109) (0.130) (0.100)
Analyst coverage 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.970 0.974 1.107* 1.113*
(2.642) (2.643) (3.931) (3.931) (1.586) (1.594) (1.805) (1.814)
Price volatility 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.820*** 0.814***
(6.437) (6.416) (6.379) (6.358) (5.051) (5.016) (5.494) (5.451)
Free cash flow −0.035*** −0.035*** −0.031*** −0.031*** 0.187** 0.185** 0.131 0.129
(−2.919) (−2.941) (−2.618) (−2.638) (2.313) (2.288) (1.590) (1.563)
Leverage −0.002* −0.002* −0.002 −0.002 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(−1.796) (−1.809) (−1.444) (−1.454) (1.156) (1.139) (1.189) (1.170)
Tobin's Q 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.029 0.029* 0.023 0.024
(4.285) (4.299) (6.627) (6.636) (1.637) (1.655) (1.401) (1.424)
Constant −0.041 −0.041 −0.038 −0.038 −0.260*** −0.258*** −0.305*** −0.303***
(−1.504) (−1.502) (−1.416) (−1.414) (−3.263) (−3.244) (−4.051) (−4.031)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Observation 17,437 17,437 17,437 17,437 17,437 17,437 17,404 17,404
Note: This table reports the results of regressing the value of repurchase announcement, measured by BHAR(−1, +1), CAR(−1, +1), BHAR
(+2, +252), or ex post 1-year BHAR (monthly), on SIR or avg_SIR and other control variables. SIR is the number of share shorted normalized
by number of shares outstanding 1 month prior to the repurchase announcements. Avg_SIR is the average SIR 3 months prior to the rep-
urchase announcements. BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and French 5*5 size and BM benchmark
portfolios. CARs are calculated following the market model with CRSP value-weighted index. Daily returns are used for calculating CARs
and BHARs in Columns (1)–(6). Monthly returns are used for calculating ex post 1-year BHAR following the repurchase announcement in
Columns (7)–(8). Stock price runup is measured by BHAR(−43, −4) in Columns (1)–(2) and (5)–(8), and measured by CAR(−43, −4) in Col-
umns (3)–(4). The variable of analyst coverage is scaled by 1,000. The reported t-statistics in brackets are based on the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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I also conduct a set of robustness checks. First, I run a
difference-in-difference test to confirm that the negative
relation between SIR and announcement return4 is due
to short sellers' expectations of repurchase
announcements. The results in Column (1) of Table 4
show that the negative relation does not exist in periods
isolated from the repurchase announcement, as the esti-
mated coefficient of SIR is insignificant for the non-
TABLE 4 Robustness checks
Non-repurchase Rep VS non-rep Positive ARs Negative ARs Excl. Other news
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SIR 0.001 0.001 −0.038** −0.078*** −0.067***
(0.321) (0.755) (−2.262) (−3.127) (−3.592)
Stock price runup −0.002*** −0.003*** −0.060*** 0.019*** −0.054***
(−4.144) (−5.866) (−9.298) (2.765) (−8.287)
Repurchase size 0.104*** −0.019 0.107***
(8.141) (−1.406) (8.425)
Cash 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.018*** −0.021*** −0.003
(4.405) (4.634) (2.970) (−3.095) (−0.522)
Firm size 0.000 0.000 −0.006*** 0.003*** −0.004***
(0.847) (−1.502) (−11.810) (5.276) (−8.464)
Analyst coverage 0.006 0.007 0.341*** −0.174 0.288***
(0.718) (0.883) (4.091) (−1.568) (3.269)
Price volatility −0.003 −0.001 0.270*** −0.174*** 0.130***
(−1.593) (−0.574) (14.038) (−8.010) (6.778)
Free cash flow 0.005*** 0.006*** −0.034*** −0.009 −0.033***
(6.037) (6.514) (−2.710) (−0.629) (−2.645)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002*
(0.985) (0.299) (−0.603) (−0.910) (−1.925)
Tobin's Q 0.000 0.000** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(1.036) (2.147) (2.605) (3.255) (4.384)
Constant −0.003*** −0.002*** 0.044*** −0.039*** −0.048*





Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq 0.001 0.003 0.183 0.106 0.057
Observation 916,958 934,395 11,393 6,044 16,377
Note: This table reports the results of robustness checks for hypothesis 1 by regressing BHAR(−1, +1) on SIR and other control variables
under different settings. SIR is the number of share shorted normalized by number of shares outstanding 1 month prior to the repurchase
announcements. BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and French 5*5 size and BM benchmark portfolios.
Stock price runup is measured by BHAR(−43, −4). Column (1) presents the regression results during non-repurchase period, while Column
(2) presents the dif-in-dif regression results by incorporating an interactive dummy variable, SIR*with_rep, measured by SIR times with_rep.
The variable, with_rep, equals 1 if there is a repurchase announcement in month t, and equals 0 otherwise. Column (3) and (4) presents the
sub-sample results among positive and negative announcement returns, respectively. Column (5) presents the regression results for a non-
other public news sample (excluding changes of analyst recommendation). The reported t-statistics in brackets are based on the
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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repurchase sample. I further incorporate an interaction
dummy between SIR and with_rep (equals to 1 if there is
a repurchase announcement in month t or 0 otherwise).
As Column (2) of Table 4 shows, the negative relation
between SIR and announcement returns during rep-
urchase announcement periods is statistically more nega-
tive than during non-repurchase announcement periods.
This further confirms that the negative relation is driven
by the anticipation of repurchase announcements.
Second, the observed negative relation between SIR
and announcement returns may potentially reflect two
scenarios: 1) a low SIR and high announcement returns,
where the repurchase announcement contains favourable
news; 2) a high SIR and low announcement returns,
where the repurchase announcement contains
unfavourable news, such as lack of investment opportu-
nities. To ensure that the negative relation does not exist
for only the favourable or unfavourable news scenarios, I
provide a robustness check by separating the sample into
two sub-samples based on the sign of announcement
returns, positive BHAR(−1, +1) and negative BHAR
(−1, +1). In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, the estimated
coefficient of SIR on returns is significantly negative in
both the positive returns and negative returns groups,
respectively. This result suggests that short sellers can
anticipate the value of repurchase announcements
whether the news is favourable or unfavourable.
Third, I re-run the tests by excluding confounding
news to ensure that the negative relation is not driven by
other public news released during the same month as the
repurchase announcement. I use changes in analyst rec-
ommendations as a proxy for other public news.5 I
exclude observation from the original sample if there is
an analyst downgrade or upgrade in the same month as
the repurchase announcement. The results in Column
(5) of Table 4 show that the observed negative relation
between SIR and announcement returns in the original
sample still hold after excluding other public news. This
enhances the argument of the informed trading
hypothesis.
4.2 | The impact of information
asymmetry
Firms with higher information asymmetry are more
likely to be mispriced. Short sellers, who should be bet-
ter informed, should have a stronger incentive to
acquire private information in the case of high levels of
information asymmetry to benefit from pre-
announcement non-public information. I incorporate an
interactive dummy variable, SIR*High Asym, to assess
whether the negative relation between SIR and
announcement returns is more significant under high
levels of information asymmetry.
Table 5 shows the sensitivity tests results for the
impact of information asymmetry, in which I use three
proxies (price volatility, analyst coverage, and firm size)
of information asymmetry. I use price volatility given
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam's (1999) finding that
higher volatility reflects higher information asymmetry.
Consistent with my expectation, Column (1) of Table 5
shows that the negative relation between SIR and
announcement returns is more significant among high
volatility firms. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) suggest that
the more analysts following a firm, the more information
is delivered to the market. My results in Column (3) show
a stronger negative SIR and announcement return rela-
tion among firms with low analyst coverage. Firm size is
also a common measurement of information asymmetry
(Llorente, Michaely, Saar, & Wang, 2002; Zhang, 2006),
where larger firms are more likely to be transparent as
they attract greater market attention. Again, I observe a
greater negative coefficient on SIR among small firms in
Column (5).
It is worth noting that smaller firms or firms with low
analyst coverage are harder to short due to the availabil-
ity of lendable shares. High volatility firms might also be
harder to short over time. Therefore, high information
asymmetry firms are likely to have a lower level of SIR
and possibility a less responsive SIR to news. To mitigate
the associated low SIR problem among high information
asymmetry firms, I demean the SIR by using the past
five-year average SIR for the firm. The regression results
in Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 5, in which I replace
SIR with the demeaned SIR to control for differences in
the equity lending market conditions, show a similar pic-
ture as the previous results. The negative relation is still
more significant among high information asymmetry
firms.
4.3 | The impact of possible repurchase
motives
Managers use repurchase announcements to signal
that the firm's stock is undervalued. However, not all
repurchase announcements correlate to this motiva-
tion. For example, Grullon and Michaely (2004) show
that firms may use repurchase programmes as a chan-
nel to distribute excess cash. Dittmar (2000) finds that
firms repurchase stocks to alter their leverage ratios.
Short sellers should have a stronger incentive to antici-
pate the announcement information in advance if the
repurchase is related to undervaluation, as the subse-
quent price correction may lead to great losses for
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short sellers. Therefore, I expect a stronger negative
relation between short selling interest and announce-
ment return if the repurchase announcement is related
to undervaluation or a less significant relation if the
announcement is related to reasons besides
undervaluation.
I use three variables (BM ratio, cash flow, and lever-
age ratio) to proxy the potential motives behind the rep-
urchase announcements. Firms with a high BM ratio are
more likely to be undervalued, high cash flow firms are
more likely to use repurchases to distribute cash (for
non-undervaluation purposes), and low leverage firms
TABLE 5 Sensitivities tests for the level of information asymmetry
Price volatility Analyst coverage Firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIR −0.041** −0.036** −0.031*
(−2.110) (−2.057) (−1.881)
SIR*high Asym −0.104*** −0.121*** −0.122**
(−3.585) (−3.372) (−2.035)
Demean SIR −0.040* −0.045** −0.044**
(−1.839) (−2.272) (−2.376)
Demean SIR*high Asym −0.100*** −0.085* −0.124*
(−2.684) (−1.896) (−1.824)
High Asym 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.020*** 0.011***
(10.287) (7.020) (7.943) (3.319) (11.802) (5.297)
Stock price runup −0.059*** −0.036*** −0.065*** −0.040*** −0.063*** −0.040***
(−11.833) (−6.159) (−13.108) (−6.870) (−12.636) (−6.750)
Repurchase size 0.103*** 0.069*** 0.103*** 0.070*** 0.104*** 0.073***
(9.751) (6.284) (9.723) (6.369) (9.867) (6.600)
Cash 0.003 0.003 0.010** 0.007 0.008* 0.006
(0.776) (0.634) (2.274) (1.391) (1.740) (1.182)
Free cash flow −0.039*** −0.004 −0.042*** −0.006 −0.040*** −0.003
(−4.183) (−0.327) (−4.473) (−0.519) (−4.323) (−0.271)
Leverage −0.003** −0.001 −0.002** −0.001 −0.002* −0.001
(−2.202) (−1.008) (−2.008) (−0.818) (−1.941) (−0.624)
Tobin's Q 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(10.457) (5.718) (8.778) (5.134) (6.309) (4.240)
Constant −0.063** −0.015 −0.060* −0.012 −0.059* −0.008
(−1.973) (−0.346) (−1.875) (−0.272) (−1.848) (−0.179)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq 0.048 0.029 0.046 0.025 0.050 0.027
Observation 17,437 9,138 17,437 9,138 17,437 9,138
Note: This table reports the results of regressing BHAR(−1, +1) on SIR and other control variables across different levels of information
asymmetry. Price volatility, analyst coverage, and firm size are used as proxies of information asymmetry. High Asym equals to 1 if the level
of information asymmetry is high (price volatility among the highest volatility quintile, the number of analysts following is less than two, or
firm size among the smallest size quintile), and 0 otherwise. SIR is the number of share shorted normalized by number of shares outstanding
1 month prior to the repurchase announcements. SIR*High Asym is an interactive dummy variable measured by SIR times High Asym.
Demean SIR is a demeaned SIR calculated by SIR minus a long-run average SIR over the past 5 years. Demean SIR*High Asym is an interac-
tive dummy variable measured by Demean SIR times High Asym. BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and
French 5*5 size and BM benchmark portfolios. Stock price runup is measured by BHAR(−43, −4). The reported t-statistics in brackets are
based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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are more likely to use repurchases to rebalance their
capital structures (for non-undervaluation purposes). I
then add an interaction dummy SIR*Under (or non-
Under) in the regression to assess the sensitivity of the
SIR to announcement returns across these repurchase
motives. Consistent with my expectation, the estimated
coefficient on the SIR in Column (1) of Table 6 is
more negative among the high BM ratio firms, whose
repurchase announcements are more likely to be
linked with signalling undervaluation. There is no
TABLE 6 Sensitivities tests for the motivations of repurchases
BM ratio Cash flow Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SIR −0.072*** −0.098*** −0.078***
(−4.328) (−5.010) (−4.256)
SIR*(Non-)Under −0.088** 0.032 −0.033
(−2.125) (1.100) (−1.079)
Demean SIR −0.067*** −0.096*** −0.082***
(−3.459) (−4.216) (−3.950)
Demean SIR*(Non-)Under −0.104** 0.030 −0.013
(−2.135) (0.853) (−0.339)
(Non-)Under 0.010*** 0.006*** −0.005*** −0.001 −0.002 0.002
(5.762) (3.117) (−2.683) (−0.690) (−1.159) (1.123)
Stock price runup −0.055*** −0.035*** −0.056*** −0.036*** −0.056*** −0.036***
(−11.065) (−5.929) (−11.250) (−6.111) (−11.212) (−6.105)
Repurchase size 0.109*** 0.074*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 0.117*** 0.079***
(10.508) (6.825) (11.320) (7.335) (11.368) (7.398)
Cash −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.006
(−0.945) (−0.417) (−1.013) (−0.646) (−0.397) (−1.062)
Firm size −0.005*** −0.002*** −0.005*** −0.003*** −0.006*** −0.003***
(−9.787) (−4.707) (−11.623) (−5.771) (−12.137) (−5.690)
Analyst coverage 0.216** 0.068 0.256** 0.085 0.258** 0.080
(2.060) (0.707) (2.450) (0.878) (2.467) (0.823)
Price volatility 0.119*** 0.092*** 0.115*** 0.091*** 0.115*** 0.092***
(7.914) (5.034) (7.675) (4.990) (7.670) (5.025)
Constant −0.036 0.004 −0.035 0.010 −0.033 0.009
(−1.123) (0.099) (−1.080) (0.236) (−1.021) (0.214)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq 0.052 0.032 0.050 0.030 0.050 0.030
Observation 17,437 9,138 17,437 9,138 17,437 9,138
Note: This table reports the results of regressing BHAR(−1, +1) on SIR and other control variables across groups with either undervaluation
related or non-undervaluation related repurchase motives. Book-to-market (BM) ratio, leverage ratio, and cash flows are used to measure the
likelihood of (non-)undervaluation. Under equals to 1 if the repurchase announcement is more likely to be linked with undervaluation rea-
son (BM ratio among the highest quintile), or 0 otherwise. Non-Under equals to 1 if the repurchase announcement is more likely to be linked
with non-undervaluation reason (cash flow among the highest quintile or leverage ratio among the lowest quintile), or 0 otherwise. SIR is
the number of share shorted normalized by number of shares outstanding 1 month prior to the repurchase announcements. SIR*(Non-)
Under is an interactive dummy variable measured by SIR times (Non-)Under. Demean SIR is a demeaned SIR calculated by SIR minus a
long-run average SIR over the past 5 years. Demean SIR*(Non-)Under is an interactive dummy variable measured by Demean SIR times
(Non-)Under. BHARs are calculated following the market-adjusted model with Fama and French 5*5 size and BM benchmark portfolios.
Stock price runup is measured by BHAR(−43, −4). The reported t-statistics in brackets are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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such significant difference in the negative SIR and
announcement returns relation among high cash flow
firms (or low leverage firms), whose repurchase
announcements are more likely to be linked with non-
undervaluation purposes. The results are similar if I
use the demeaned SIR.
5 | CONCLUSION
This study provides evidence that short sellers avoid
targeting firms with favourable news. The significant nega-
tive relation between pre-announcement short selling inter-
est and announcement returns suggests that short sellers
anticipate the value of repurchase announcements in
advance in order to prevent potential losses. This negative
relation is stronger among firms that are more likely to be
mispriced and more significant among firms that make rep-
urchase announcements to signal undervaluation.
My findings suggest that silent short selling could add
credibility to the repurchase announcements made to sig-
nal undervaluation. Market participants should learn
from short selling activities, as short selling data are
becoming more available, which could potentially speed
up information transmission and improve market
efficiency.
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1 Boehmer et al. (2010) show that low short interest, in general,
sends out positive signals about future stock returns. My study
provides direct evidence of the source (e.g., anticipating corporate
favourable news) of such positive signals.
2 Short sales were reported on the 15th business day of each month
before 2007 and increased to twice (the 15th and the last business
day) per month after 2007. I keep only the monthly data for the
15th business day to maintain consistency.
3 The breakpoints of size and BM portfolios are available from
French's online data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
4 The BHAR(−1, +1) during the non-repurchase period is calcu-
lated based on the 15th business day of each non-repurchase
month.
5 The logic of using changes in analyst recommendations as a proxy
follows Savor (2012), who argue that public news associated with
new information is likely to be captured by analysts.
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